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COMMENT
Computer Program Patentability-The CCPA Refuses to
Follow the Lead of the Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook
The protection of computer programs and program-related inven-
tions' by patents is an issue that has recently engendered much contro-
versy and commentary.' Advocates of program patentability3 argue
that protection for the investments of time and skill necessary to create
computer programs is justified under classic patent theory. They rea-
son that, by rewarding producers of new and useful programs with lim-
ited monopolies in exchange for public disclosure of their inventions,
society at large will benefit. Opponents of program patentability,
which include hardware manufacturers5 and the Patent and Trade-
mark Office,6 contend that program patentability will not increase the
1. See notes 26 & 27 and accompanying text infra.
2. See, e.g., Ross, The Patentabity of Computer Firmware, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 731
(1977); Soltysinski, Computer Programs and the Patent Law: 4 Comparative Study, 3 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS & L. 1 (1973); Upchurch, A Templatefor Judicial Resolution of Computer Program
Patentabiliy, 9 GA. L. REv. 855 (1975); Note, Gottschalk v. Benson-Bright Light-Dim Future,
28 BAYLOR L. REv. 187 (1976); Comment, Computer Program Classification: 4 Limitation on Pro-
gram Patentability as a Process, 53 ORE. L. REV. 501 (1974); Note, Gottschalk v. Benson-The
Supreme Court Takes 4 Hard Line on Software, 47 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 635 (1973); Comment,
Patentability: Piecing Together The Computer Software Patent Puzzle, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351
(1975); 14 B.C. INDUS. COM. L. REV. 1050 (1973); authorities cited note 7 infra. A very good
bibliography on the legal protection of computer software is found in Nimtz, Development of the
Law of Computer Software, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3, 26-43 (1979).
3. One of the main proponents of patentability is the rapidly expanding computer software
industry. According to one estimate, the value of computer software in use in the United States in
1976 was $43.1 billion and was projected to be $70.7 billion by 1980. See Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584, 587 n.7 (1978). Another estimate places user expenditures for software in 1978 alone at
$981 million. Cunningham & Smith, Computer Services: A Menu of Options, DATAMATION, May
25, 1979, at 89, 91. Although such estimates give a general idea of the size of the industry, differ-
ent definitions of the term "software" often make comparison difficult. See note 24 infra.
4. See Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RUTGERS J. COM-
PUTERS & L. 1, 19-20 (1977). The general theory is that the patent system encourages invention by
rewarding inventors, attracts risk capital to industry research and prevents the hoarding of techno-
logical innovation. Id The patent system in the United States is not based historically on any
theory of natural right in the inventor. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966).
5. Hardware manufacturers are those firms that produce the actual computing machinery.
Most hardware manufacturers have extensive libraries of programs and often sell or give these
computer programs to their customers. The value of their machines increases with the availability
of programs. Thus, it is generally in their interest to discourage program patentability. See gener-
ally Scafetta, Computer Software Protection: The Copyright Revision Bills and,41ternatives, 8 JOHN
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 381 (1975); Davis, supra note 4, at 5-6 & n.25.
6. The Patent and Trademark Office, in charge of administering the patent laws in the
United States, estimated that approximately 600-900 applications for program-related patents
were pending in 1978, and that approximately 450 such applications are filed each year. Brief for
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dissemination of new ideas and will do little to promote the already
competitive research in the field.7 Judicial opinion on the subject has
not focused on these essentially economic policy issues; rather, it has
addressed the more technical question whether program-related inven-
tions are truly inventions under applicable statutes and case law. More
specifically, recent judicial discussion has centered on whether
processes employing steps of a mathematical or algorithmic" nature are
properly included within the term "process" as used in section 1019 of
the Patent Act. This Comment will summarize the case law on this
issue as developed by the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA)' ° and will discuss the somewhat uncertain effect of
the 1978 Supreme Court decision in Parker v. Flook.t I
The Constitution explicitly delegates to Congress the power to cre-
ate a federal patent system.' 2 The Constitution does not spell out any
Petitioner, Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), reprinted in PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., March
23, 1978, at D-1, D-7 n.24. A tremendous increase in such applications would undoubtedly occur
if programs were clearly patentable. Notwithstanding the questionable status of program-related
inventions in 1978 and 1979, there has been an increase in the number of applications in which the
patentability of computer programs is an issue. See Petition for Certiorari, Diamond v. Bradley,
No. 79-855 (U.S. 1979), reprinted in PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., Dec. 13, 1979, at E-I, E-4 (3,000
patent applications pending in which the patentability of computer software or firmware is a po-
tential issue). The increased administrative burden and the practical difficulties inherent in exe-
cuting prior art searches for program-related inventions probably account for the apparent
hostility toward program patents shown by the Office. See Davis, supra note 4, at 21.
7. For a summary of arguments both for and against patentability, see Soltysinski, supra
note 2, at 57-78. No discussion of the economic policy arguments for program patents is at-
tempted in this Comment. Factors affecting analysis in this area include trade secret and copy-
right law, both of which may offer some protection to computer programs. Discussions comparing
trade secret and copyright protection to that afforded by patents may be found in the following
commentary: Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970);
Davis, supra note 4; Note, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L. ReV. 1274
(1964); Note, Protection of Computer Software-A Hard Problem, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 180 (1976-
1977); Note, Protection of Computer Programs: Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW 333 (1974); Note, Patentability of Computer Programs, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 494 (1973).
8. See note 30 infra.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). This section specifies those categories of subject matter that may
qualify for patent protection. It provides that "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
The term "method" is synonymous with "process" and the term "apparatus" is generally preferred
to "machine" in discussion of patent claims. P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 73, 76
(1975).
10. The CCPA has jurisdiction to review rejections of patent applications made by the Patent
and Trademark Office under § 141 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1976). All CCPA cases
discussed herein are of this type. The Supreme Court may grant certiorari to review a decision of
the CCPA under 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1976).
11. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
12. "The Congress shall have the Power. . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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subject matter requirements for patentability, but it does indicate that
the objective of the system should be to promote the progress of science
and the "useful arts."' 3 Congress must supply the statutory framework
to further this objective. The exercise of this power, however, is per-
missive rather than mandatory; Congress may legitimately withhold
patent protection from some, or even all, subject matter. 4 Although
the term "process" was not used by Congress to designate patentable
subject matter until 1952,11 it was early held that processes could be
patented under statutes authorizing protection for "any new and useful
art." '6 The present Patent Act gives little guidance in determining ex-
actly which processes are meant to constitute patentable subject matter,
providing only that "[t]he term 'process' means process, art or method,
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material."' 7 Thus, with a few exceptions,' 8
case law provides the relevant principles for determining statutory sub-
ject matter.
The case law with respect to program-related inventions has pro-
duced a vast amount of confusion, partly due to the terminology and
technology employed in the computer industry. 9 Computers are gen-
erally defined to be devices "capable of accepting information, apply-
ing prescribed processes to the information and supplying the results of
these processes."'2 Thus, computers are primarily devices for manipu-
lating information, though physical processes must necessarily be in-
volved in carrying out this task. The two basic categories of computers
are defined by the way in which the physical processes are employed to
13. Id
14. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (I How.) 202, 206 (1843).
15. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 101 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
16. Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267 (1853) (construing Patent Act of 1836, ch.
357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117 (1836)).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1976).
18. See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 151, 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (1976) (excluding inven-
tions useful only in atomic weapons).
19. Judge Edenfield's comment on the matter is well known:
[T]he first finding the court is constrained to make is that, in the computer age, lawyers
and courts need no longer feel ashamed or even sensitive about the charge, often made,
that they confuse the issue by resort to legal "jargon," law Latin or Norman French. By
comparison, the misnomers and industrial shorthand of the computer world make the
most esoteric legal writing seem as clear and lucid as the Ten Commandments or the
Gettysburg Address; and to add to this Babel, the experts in the computer field, while
using exactly the same words, uniformly disagree as to precisely what they mean.
Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 408 (1970).
20. C. SIPPL & C, SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 99 (2d ed. 1972).
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solve problems. Analog computers work by translating physical condi-
tions, such as velocity or temperature, into related mechanical or elec-
trical quantities and then using mechanical or electrical-equivalent
circuits as an analog for the physical phenomenon being investigated.2'
Digital computers process information represented by combinations of
discrete or discontinuous data. The data is represented by electrical
impulses, and mathematical and logical operations are simulated by
directing these impulses through the computer's circuitry by the use of
programs.22 The actual circuitry and other physical items in the com-
puter are often called "hardware." When drafted in structural terms a
claim for patent protection of hardware presents no different patent law
problems than does a claim for any other electronic device.23  Com-
puter programs, however, are part of the computing system's
"software. '24 A program may be defined as "a series of instructions or
statements, in a form acceptable to a computer, prepared in order to
achieve a certain result."25 The essence of the program is the nature of
the instructions, not the particular physical embodiment.26 As used in
21. See D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.01 (1978). The cir-
cuit equations in an analog computer have the same mathematical form as the problem equations,
This allows the analog computer to solve problems by analogy, varying the voltages in its circuitry
to represent physical data outside the computer. Id The analog computer is normally a special
purpose device used in a scientific or technological context and is not commonly used in commer-
cial applications. Id at 2-5.
22. See id § 2.02-.05. Nearly all digital computers employ the principles of binary arithme-
tic. The most basic unit of information is the "binary digit," or "bit." It may have only one of two
values (e.g., 0 or 1). A sequence of adjacent bits, usually eight, forms a "byte," and "bytes"
combine to form "words." Information is coded into this form and sent into the computer via
electronic impulses. The information may be stored by setting up states of magnetic polarity on
very small pieces of ceramic, by using semiconductors or by various other means. See id
§ 2.05[3]. Information thus stored in the computer's "memory" is known as the data base. Most
of what the computer does can be broken down into the four arithmetic operations (addition,
subtraction, multiplication, and division) and the comparison of one quantity with another. Id
§ 2.0514], at 2-90. For example, the proper construction of switching networks to control the path
of the electronic impulses and "registers" to store the impulse data will produce circuitry that will
"add" binary numbers. The most elemental arithmetic operations may be performed with such
fixed circuitry. It is computer programs, however, that direct impulses through the circuitry to
effect the more complicated operations that make the computer useful.
23. See In re Maucorps, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 812, 816 (C.C.P.A. Nov. 1, 1979); In re Free-
man, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 n.10 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
24. The term "software" is sometimes used to denote three components of a computing sys-
tem-the programs, the data base and the documentation. D. BENDER, supra note 21, § 2.06, at 2-
112. The documentation is the collection of documents that explain or describe the functioning of
any part of the computing system. The term "software" is also used when referring only to pro-
grams.
25. Id; accord, In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ("a set of instructions for
carrying out prearranged operations on data by use of processing equipment").
26. The computer program may start out as a stack of punched cards, but when introduced
into the computer it may exist only as a series of magnetic polarities in the computer's "memory."
See note 22 supra. It is nonetheless the same program.
System programs, often called system software, control the performance and functions of the
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this Comment, the term "program-related invention" will refer to a
process or apparatus the patenting of which would protect one or more
computer programs. Thus, a patent claim27 that encompasses or "reads
on" a set of instructions, in a form acceptable to a computer, will con-
stitute a claim on a program-related invention.
In the recent case of Parker v. Flook,28 the United States Supreme
Court found that a program-related invention consisting of a new
method for updating alarm limit values of process variables in the cata-
lytic conversion of hydrocarbons29 was not within the meaning of
"process" as used in section 101 of the Patent Act. The method em-
ployed as its sole novel element a mathematical algorithm designed
computer hardware by regulating the execution of other programs, optimizing the efficiency of the
system, and generally providing the link between programming languages that are understood by
human beings and the computer's circuitry. Application programs instruct the computer on how
to solve particular problems. See D. BENDER, supra note 21, § 2.06. The control of the computer
achieved by systems and application programs theoretically could be accomplished by an actual
physical rewiring of the computer, but this would be impractical. It is instructive, however, to
think of programs as automatically "rewiring" or "softwiring" the computer, and some commen-
tators have characterized programs as "instant hardware." See Comment, Patents and Computer
Programs-The Supreme Court Makes A Decision, 62 Ky. L.J. 533, 534 (1974).
27. The claims in a patent application are the only definitive statement of the invention; they
alone describe the boundaries of the monopoly that the inventor seeks. When a reading of a claim
indicates that a particular process or apparatus would be covered should a patent issue, the claim
is said to "read on" that subject matter. P. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 38.
There are three cardinal rules that must be observed in order to present a valid claim: (I)
each claim must be expressed in a single sentence; (2) the object of each claim must read on the
unique combination of features which are distinctive of and which characterize the invention; and
(3) the object of each claim must not read on a combination of features found united in the same
manner in the prior art. Id
28. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). Lutrelle F. Parker was Acting Commissioner of the Patent and
Trademark Office at the time the petition for writ of certiorari was filed. Dale R. Flook was the
inventor.
29. The Court explained the invention as follows:
An "alarm limit" is a number. During catalytic conversion processes, operating
conditions such as temperature, pressure, and flow rates are constantly monitored.
When any of these "process variables" exceeds a predetermined "alarm limit," an alarm
may signal the presence of an abnormal condition indicating either inefficiency or per-
haps danger. Fixed alarm limits may be appropriate for a steady operation, but during
transient operating situations, such as start-up, it may be necessary to "update" the alarm
limits periodically.
Respondent's patent application describes a method of updating alarm limits. In
essence, the method consists of three steps: an initial step which merely measures the
present value of the process variable (e.g. the temperature); an intermediate step which
uses an algorithm to calculate an updated alarm-limit value; and a final step in which the
actual alarm limit is adjusted to the updated value.
Id at 585 (footnotes omitted).
The catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons is a common process in the petrochemical and oil
refining industries. Thus, Flook's claims covered a broad range of potential uses. Uses outside the
catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons were also conceivable but were not claimed. Id at 586.
30. Id at 584. The Court defined "algorithm" as a "procedure for solving a given type of
mathematical problem," a definition that previously had been used by the Court in Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972). 437 U.S. at 584 n.1. In the context of computer programming, the
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primarily for automated use in a digital computer. The Court reaf-
firmed its holding in Gottschalk v. Benson3 that an algorithm or math-
ematical formula is one of the "basic tools of scientific and
technological work" and, therefore, not patentable subject matter.32
The Court went on to point out that a process is not unpatentable sim-
ply because it contains an algorithm; the application of an algorithm to
a new and useful end definitely may constitute patentable subject mat-
ter.33 Such an application itself, however, must contain some inventive
concept other than the algorithm if the claimed process is to rise to the
status of a patentable invention.34 Because Flook's method, except for
his algorithm, consisted entirely of steps well-known in the industry,
the Court held there was no inventive concept and thus no patentable
subject matter.35  The Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook thus an-
nounced a new test for the subject matter patentability of processes em-
bodying mathematical algorithms. The algorithm or formula,
regardless of its novelty, must first be considered to be within prior art,
and the process must then be evaluated to determine whether a patent-
able invention exists by virtue of an inventive application of the al-
gorithm or formula.
Justice Stewart; speaking for the three dissenting members of the
Court,36 found that this test improperly injected criteria of novelty and
inventiveness, the subjects of sections 102"7 and 10338 of the Patent Act
respectively, into the consideration of subject matter patentability as
definition is usually not specifically limited to mathematical problem solving procedures. "An
algorithm is a rigidly defined, step-by-step procedure for solving a particular problem in a finite
number of steps; the algorithm yields a solution to the particular problem under all circum-
stances." D. BENDER, supra note 21, § 2.06[3)[a], at 2-118 n.23.
31. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See text accompanying notes 84-96 infra.
32. 437 U.S. at 590.
33. Id at 591.
34. Id at 594.
35. Id
36. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Id at 598.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). This section provides in part: "A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless-(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the
application for patent."
38. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). This section reads as follows:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
[Vol. 58
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defined by section 101.19 Although the dissenters reserved judgment on
whether a patent should have actually issued under sections 102 and
103, they agreed with the the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
that the method in Flook passed the test for subject matter patentabil-
ity.40 In doing so, the dissenters specifically approved the rationale
used in a recent line of cases by the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals.4' These cases relied on the CCPA's interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, and, in part, on
CCPA cases decided before Benson. The CCPA has not yet abandoned
the principles enunciated in the cases prior to Flook. CCPA cases de-
cided after Flook indicate that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's
new test for subject matter patentability, CCPA policy toward pro-
gram-related inventions will change little. Thus, an analysis of the
state of the law in this area requires review of the older CCPA cases.
I. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW: THE MENTAL
PROCESS DOCTRINE
The first notable judicial opinion concerning the patentability of a
program-related invention was In re Prater.42 In Prater, the CCPA re-
viewed a rejection by the Patent Office of process and apparatus claims
for a new method of processing spectrographic data. The object of the
new method was to select those equations least susceptible to error am-
plification in certain types of spectrographic analysis.43 The claimed
method involved using mathematical calculations for generating equa-
tions, comparing the determinant functions of various subsets of the
equations and reproducing a spectrogram based on the subset of equa-
tions having the highest mathematical determinant." Because the
method claims encompassed the performance of the method by a prop-
erly programmed digital computer," the claimants, in effect, sought
protection for a computer program. In their apparatus claims the in-
39. 437 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The text of § 101 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1970), appears at note 9 supra.
40. 437 U.S. at 600.
41. Id The cases mentioned were In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Rich-
man, 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re
Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977); and In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cer.
denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
42. 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), modoed on rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
43. The spectrographic analysis referred to in the invention was intended to produce data on
the relative proportions of various known constituent gases in a mixture of gases. 415 F.2d at
1378.
44. Id at 1380.
45. Id
1980]
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ventors sought protection for any means of performing the method as
described in the method claim,46 and in their specification 47 disclosed
an analog device capable of performing such a function. 8
The Patent Office had based its rejection in Prater, in part, on the
mental process doctrine. The roots of this doctrine apparently
stemmed from cases holding that methods requiring mental steps such
as emotional reactions or subjective judgment for their performance
were not proper subjects for patents.49 One rationale for this doctrine
was that the results produced by such methods would not be predict-
able and that the method thus would be too vague and indefinite to
constitute patentable subject matter.50 Another rationale was that
thought processes were not "useful arts," and, thus, not the sort of tan-
gible embodiments of ideas contemplated as patentable in the Consti-
tution."' Assuming the mathematical calculations required in the
Prater claims to be unpatentable mental steps would not have ended
the matter, however, because an invention may include, as a compo-
nent, unpatentable subject matter and, nevertheless, constitute, as a
whole, a patentable invention. 52 To solve this problem, the Patent Of-
fice used three "rules" mentioned in In re Abrams,53 an earlier mental
process case involving mathematical calculations. The Abrams rules
were designed to determine whether a process was statutory on the ba-
sis of the alleged point of novelty:
1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely mental in character,
the subject matter thereof is not patentable within the meaning
of the patent statutes.
46. Id at 1381. The apparatus claims were couched in "means plus function" form. A claim
of this type is construed to read on any means capable of performing the functions as described.
This is the broadest and most generalized mode of claiming allowed and is usually reserved for
pioneer invention. It is, however, expressly sanctioned by § 112 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, para. 3 (1976). See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 47-50.
47. A patent application must contain a written description of the claimed invention in such
terms as will enable any person "skilled in the art" to make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, para. 1 (1976). This part of the application directly precedes the claims, but is not part of
the claims. Although the term "specification," as used in the Patent Act, clearly includes the
claims, the term is commonly used to refer only to this detailed description or disclosure. See P.
ROSENBERG, su.pra note 9, at 200.
48. 415 F.2d at 1379.
49. McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its Origin, Legal Basls and Scope, 55 IOWA L.
REV. 1148, 1179-80 (1970).
50. Id
51. SeeIn re Sarker, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Cf. In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168
(C.C.P.A. 1951) ("It is self evident that thought is not patentable.").
52. See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 (1939) (an-
tenna constructed in conformance with mathematical formula patentable invention).
53. 188 E2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
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2. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as
well as so-called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance
over the art resides in one or more of the so-called mental steps,
then the claim is considered unpatentable for the same reason
that it would be if all the steps were purely mental in character.
3. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as
well as so-called mental steps, yet the novelty or advance over
the art resides in one or more of the positive and physical steps
and the so-called mental step or steps are incidental parts of the
process which are essential to define, qualify or limit its scope,
then the claim is patentable and not subject to the objection con-
tained in 1 or 2 above.5
The Patent Office argued that the Prater method claims were
clearly within rule two because their point of novelty was purely
mental in character and that they were thus unpatentable subject mat-
ter.5  The apparatus claims were rejected because they "read on"56-
that is, they could be read as seeking patent protection for-a properly
programmed digital computer. No protection could be accorded such a
device under rule two of Abrams. Because the claims appeared to seek
protection for the unpatentable subject matter, the Patent Office main-
tained that the claims did not particularly point out and distinctly claim
the invention as required by section 112 of the Patent Act.57
Judge Smith, speaking for the CCPA in the first Prater opinion,
stated that the Abrams court had accepted the rules enunciated in that
case only arguendo, and that the present court would not feel con-
strained by them.5" He also noted that the often-cited proposition that
processes must operate physically on substances in order to constitute
patentable subject matter derived from a misreading of a passage in
Cochrane v. Deener59 and had been discredited by later Supreme Court
cases.60 Having thus cleared the way for an unencumbered statement
54. Id at 166.
55. 415 F.2d at 1381.
56. For an explanation of the term "read on," see note 27 supra.
57. 415 F.2d at 1381-82. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 (1976) provides: "The specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.' The Patent Office also made other rejections
based on 35 U.S.C. § 112 and 35 U.S.C. § 103. The rejections were all reversed in the first Prater
opinion. Put see note 64 infra.
58. 415 F.2d at 1386, 1389.
59. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
60. 415 F.2d at 1387-88. The language in Cochrane indicated that a patentable process must
transform substances into a different state or thing:
A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an
act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced
to a different state or thing .... The process requires that certain things should be done
1980]
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on program-related inventions, the court held that the disclosure of a
machine capable of performing the claimed combination of steps dis-
tinguished the Prater method from ones previously held unpatentable
under the mental process doctrine. That the process steps could be al-
ternatively performed in the human mind, or with aid of a pencil and
paper, was held not to be fatal to the claims. 6' The process was di-
rected to use in an industrial technology that was clearly within the
meaning of "useful arts."62 This reasoning saved the method and ap-
paratus claims from rejections based on the mental process doctrine as
employed in the Abrams rules.63 Although the court later sustained the
Patent Office rejection of the method claims under paragraph two of
section 112," the clear signal from the CCPA in Prater was that com-
puter program-related inventions could avoid the mental process doc-
trine with properly drafted claims.65
Subsequent cases confirmed the CCPA's willingness to narrow the
mental process doctrine so as not to preclude the patenting of funda-
mentally machine-implemented processes. In In re Bernhart,66 the in-
ventors sought to claim an apparatus and method for automatically
making a two-dimensional portrayal of a three-dimensional object us-
ing a computer and an attached planar plotting apparatus. Because the
with certain substances, and in a certain order; but the tools to be used in doing this may
be of secondary consequence.
94 U.S. at 788.
Judge Smith argued that the language, in addition to being dictum, was never intended to
limit statutory processes, but was instead meant to point out that a process is not limited to the
particular means used in performing it. 415 F.2d at 1387-88.
61. 415 F.2d at 1389.
62. Id
63. Id
64. On rehearing, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969), the court generally approved Judge Smith's
analysis of.4brams and Cochrane and agreed that the capability of machine implementation dis-
tinguished the Prater claims from those in previous cases. The court noted, however, that the
inventors alleged that they did not seek protection for the mental performance of the method
described. Because the method claims did read on such a performance of the method, the inven-
tors had failed to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2 quoted at note 57 supra. 415
F.2d at 1404.
65. No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Constitution, statute, or case law,
apparatus and process claims broad enough to encompass the operation of a program-
med general-purpose digital computer are necessarily unpatentabe. In one sense, a gen"
eral-purpose digital computer may be regarded as but a storeroom of parts and/or
electrical components. But once a program has been introduced, the general-purpose
digital computer becomes a special-purpose digital computer (i.e., a specific electrical
circuit with or without electro-mechanical components) which, along with the process by
which it operates, may be patented subject, of course, to the requirements of novelty,
utility, and non-obviousness. Based on the present law, we see no other reasonable con-
clusion.
415 F.2d at 1403 n.29 (on rehearing) (emphasis in original).
66. 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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concept of computer drawing was known in the prior art at the time,
the inventors' particular mathematical equation for three-to-two di-
mensional transformation was the only novel component of the inven-
tion.67 The court found that the method and apparatus claims covered
only machine implementation of the described method and, therefore,
avoided any mental process or section 112 objections.68 In reviewing a
rejection of the apparatus claims based on the Abrams rules, the court
criticized the "point of novelty" approach taken in that case as being
inconsistent with the intent of Congress as expressed in sections 101
and 103 of the Patent Act.69 The court also suggested that, because a
programmed computer was a different machine from an unpro-
grammed one, new computer programs might be easily protected in the
form of apparatus claims.70
Although it refused to make a blanket ruling on the patentability
of programs per se, the CCPA continued to make the claiming of pro-
gram-related inventions an easy task. The court began to rely on a
more liberal standard of reasonableness in claim interpretation so as to
avoid section 112 objections like those expressed in Prater.71 In In re
Musgrave,72 the court again criticized the point of novelty approach,
67. See id at 1396, 1398.
68. Id at 1401.
69. The principle may, we think, be fairly stated as follows: If, in an invention defined
by a claim, the novelty is indicated by an expression which does not itself fit in a statu-
tory class. . . then the whole invention is non-statutory since all else in the claim is old.
We do not believe this view is correct under the Patent Act and the case law thus far
developed.
' * * [A]ll machines function according to laws of physics which can be mathemati-
cally set forth if known. We cannot deny patents on machines merely because their
novelty may be explained in terms of such laws if we are to obey the mandate of Con-
gress that a machine is subject matter for a patent. We should not penalize the inventor
who makes his invention by discovering new and unobvious mathematical relationships
which he then utilizes in a machine, as against the inventor who makes the same machine
by trial and error and does not disclose the laws by which it operates. The mandate of
Congress in 35 U.S.C. § 103 is that "patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made."
Id at 1399-1400.
70. [I]f a machine is programmed in a certain new and unobvious way, it is physically
different from the machine without that program; its memory elements are differently
arranged. The fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt
us to conclude that the machine has not been changed. If a new machine has not been
invented, certainly a 'new and useful improvement' of the unprogrammed machine has
been, and Congress has said in 35 U.S.C. § 101 that such improvements are statutory
subject matter for a patent.
Id at 1400. See note 26 supra.
71. See, e.g., In re Mahony, 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (term "bit" when used in "bit
stream" precludes claim from reading on mental processes). See also 14 B.C. INDUs. COM. L.
REv. 1050 at 1053-60 (1973).
72. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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noting that subject matter patentability was, by definition, not an issue
that depended on the novelty of the subject matter.73 Another passage
in Musgrave announced a test for statutory processes that confirmed
the original holding in Prater and suggested that the only limits on the
subject matter patentability of processes were constitutional ones.74
The reasoning of Musgrave was employed in In re Benson 7 to ap-
prove the subject matter patentability of a method for converting bi-
nary coded decimal numerals into pure binary numerals.76 The claims
were couched in terms of a mathematical algorithm and were designed
as a more efficient way to convert numerical values stored in a digital
computer.77 The court noted at the outset of the opinion that, unlike
most previously claimed inventions in this area, the Benson claims were
addressed solely to the art of data processing and not to any particular
end use.7 8 One of the method claims was so broadly drawn, however,
that, if read literally, it encompassed the human performance of the
mathematical operation described by the algorithm as well as any elec-
tromechanical implementation.79 Judge Rich, speaking for a unani-
mous court, found that, under a reasonable interpretation, the claimed
73. It should be apparent . . . that novelty and advancement of an art are irrelevant to a
determination of whether the nature of a process is such that it is encompassed by the
meaning of "process" in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Were that not so. . . a given process including
both "physical" and "mental" steps could be statutory during the infancy of the field of
technology to which it pertained, when the physical steps were new, and non-statutory at
some later time after the physical steps became old, acquiring prior art status, which
would be an absurd result. Logically, the identical process cannot be first within and
later without the categories of statutory subject matter, depending on such extraneous
factors.
Id at 889.
74. We cannot agree. . . that these claims (all of the steps of which can be carried out
by the disclosed apparatus) are directed to non-statutory processes merely because some
or all the steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or
because it may be necessary for one performing the processes to think. All that is neces-
sary, in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory orocess' within 35
US. C § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Consti-
tutional purpose to promote the progress ofthe "use/ul arts."
Id at 893 (referring to U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8) (emphasis added). See also In re Waldbaum, 457
F.2d 997, 1003-04 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (commenting on synonymity of "useful arts" and "technologi-
cal arts").
75. 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rep'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
76. Binary numerals, or "base two" numerals, represent numbers using only two symbols
(eag, "0" and "I"), rather than the ten symbols commonly used in the decimal system (0, 1, 2, 3
9). Binary coded decimals are essentially decimal, but each decimal digit is represented with
a group of binary numerals. Digital computers normally work in the pure binary system, but
when extensive arithmetic operations are not required, and time required for converting to and
from the decimal system is important, the binary coded decimal system is useful. See D. BENDER,
supra note 21, § 2.03[2].
77. 441 F.2d at 682-83.
78. Id at 686.
79. Id at 688.
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process had "no practical use other than the more effective operation
and utilization of a machine known as a digital computer."' 0 Because
such computers were within the "technological field" and thus within
the concept of the "useful arts," the process passed the Musgrave test
and was held to be patentable subject matter.8'
II. THE EFFECT OF GOTTSCHALK V BENSON
After the CCPA's opinion in In re Benson it was clear that any
new and useful computer program, properly claimed, could qualify as
patentable subject matter. The Patent Office, having neither a classifi-
cation technique nor a prior art searching system adequate for the large
number of programs on the market at the time, 2 obtained a writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court.83 In Gottschalk v. Benson,84 the
Supreme Court neither discussed nor mentioned the line of CCPA
cases leading up to In re Benson, but did agree with the Patent Office
that the claimed method was unpatentable subject matter under section
101 of the Patent Act. The Court used older, established precedent to
support the proposition that mathematical formulae and algorithms8"
were, like ideas, phenomena of nature and scientific principles, unpat-
entable subject matter.86 The algorithm embodied in the Benson
claims, when separated from the context of computer implementation,
was nothing more than a mathematical formula, an idea or abstract
concept, and, as such, fell into the category of unpatentable subject
matter.87 The Court held that limiting the method claims to implemen-
tation within a digital computer would not take the process out of the
category of excluded matter because the only substantial practical ap-
plication of the algorithm was within such a device; a patent on the
computer implementation of the algorithm would totally preempt the
algorithm and would be, in effect, a patent on the algorithm itself.8
80. Id (emphasis in original).
81. Id
82. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972).
83. 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
84. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
85. See note 30 supra.
86. 409 U.S. at 67. The Court cited Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,
306 U.S. 86 (1938) (scientific truth, or mathematical expression of scientific truth, not patentable);
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874) (idea not patentable); and Le
Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852) ("principle in the abstract" not patentable).
87. "Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellec-
tual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."
409 U.S. at 67.
88. "The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except
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The above analysis became known as the "nutshell" of the Benson
opinion. The only clear holding was that mere computer implementa-
tion of a mathematical algorithm would not qualify the algorithm as a
patentable process if all practical uses of the algorithm were thereby
preempted. 9 Other portions of the opinion were emphasized by vari-
ous commentators with widely different results in interpretation. The
Court discussed Cochrane v. Deener and the line of cases following it
suggesting that "transformation and reduction of an article 'to a differ-
ent state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that
does not include particular machines." 9° Immediately after discussing
this line of cases, however, the Court declared that "we do not hold that
no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements
of our prior precedents."'" Some observers, nevertheless, felt that Ben-
son was based on Cochrane.92 Other language in Benson-including
the "nutshell"-indicated that the objectionable aspect of the claims
was that all practical uses of the algorithm, both known and unknown,
were covered.93 The Court pointed to the seminal case on processes,
O'Reilo) v. Morse,94 in which a patent was allowed for a process of
using electromagnetism to produce distinguishable signals for telegra-
phy. The Court noted that Morse's eighth claim, for the use of "elec-
tromagnetism, however developed, for marking or printing intelligible
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances," was declared invalid be-
cause of its undue breadth.95 Morse had, in effect, attempted to mo-
nopolize a scientific principle whenever it was used to accomplish a
given end result. Although not distinguished by the Court, the breadth
in connection with a digital computer, which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent
on the algorithm itself." Id at 71-72.
89. Some language in Benson suggested that the Court did not recognize one of the process
claims as being limited to machine implementation. See id at 68. The language in the "nutshell,"
however, implies that limitation of claims to machine implementation is not a saving factor. See
note 88 supra.
90. 409 U.S. at 70.
91. Id at 71.
92. See, e.g., Note, Computer Software: Beyond the Limits of Existing Proprietary Protection
Policy, 40 BROOKL N L. REv. 116, 139-40 (1973). In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court stated
that the Benson decision did not rely on Cochrane. 437 U.S. at 588 n.9.
93. Here the "process" claim is so abstract and sweeping as to cover both known and
unknown uses of the [binary coded decimal] to pure binary conversion. The end use
may (1) vary from the operation of a train to verification of drivers' licenses to research-
ing the law books for precedents and (2) be performed through any existing machinery
or future-devised machinery or without any apparatus.
409 U.S. at 68.
94. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
95. 409 U.S. at 68.
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of at least one of Benson's claims was caused by a different factor: the
means of applying the principle was distinctly claimed-the mathemat-
ical relationship between binary and binary coded decimal numerals
was claimed within the context of a process for the automatic process-
ing of data. Benson's claims were considered overly broad because no
specific end use other than "data processing" limited the scope of the
claims. Thus, some observers felt that an inventor might avoid the ra-
tionale in Benson by limiting the end use of the algorithm in his
claims.96 Also left unclear by Benson was the status of the CCPA cases
leading up to Benson, especially as they related to the point of novelty
approach to subject matter patentability and the policy on statutory
processes announced in Musgrave.
With apparent dissatisfaction among members of the court con-
cerning the clarity of the Benson opinion," the CCPA began its task of
interpreting that decision. In re Christensen,98 decided seven months
after the Supreme Court's decision in Benson, involved the subject mat-
ter patentability of a method for determining subsurface porosity.99
The method included several physical steps, the purpose of which was
to collect geological data, but the only novel element of the method was
the final step, a mathematical formula that used the collected data to
calculate porosity."c° The court found that Benson prohibited the pat-
enting of a method for solving mathematical equations and that the
Christensen claims attempted to do just that. The addition of old and
necessary antecedent steps for collecting values to be used in the
formula did not make the method any less a method of calculation 0 1
96. See, e.g., Comment, Computer Program Classflcation: A Limitation on Program Patenta-
bility as a Process, 53 ORE. L. REv. 501, 518-19 (1974).
97. See In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1395-96 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (Rich, J., concurring).
98. 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
99. Id. at 1392. Porosity is a geological concept that expresses the ratio of the volume of
pores or interstices of a rock or rock stratum to the total volume of the mass. It is commonly used
in prospecting for oil.
100. Id at 1392-93.
101. Id at 1394. Confusion was created in later cases because of language in Christensen that
suggested a "point of novelty" approach: "The issue before us in the instant case is. . . a narrow
one, namely, is a method claim in which the point of novelty is a mathematical equation to be
solved as the final step of the method, a statutory method? We follow the Supreme Court in
concluding that the answer is in the negative." Id In a later case the CCPA effectively "read out"
the point of novelty language by holding that a method including a mathematical equation as the
final step was nonstatutory notwithstanding the novelty of the antecedent data-collecting steps. In
re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977). See text accompanying notes 139-44 infra.
The CCPA in Christensen reserved judgment on the viability of the mental steps doctrine, but
clearly indicated that it considered the Benson doctrine to be separate. 478 F.2d at 1395. Because
the Benson doctrine appeared to apply directly to program-related inventions, the Patent Office
relied on the mental process doctrine less often. Its importance has, for this reason, diminished.
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Furthermore, merely limiting use of the results of the calculation to the
single purpose of determining porosity did not take the method out of
the Benson rationale that mathematical formulae and algorithms are
not subject to preemption by patents.' 02
In In re Chaoeld,'°3 however, the court countered Patent Office
arguments that Benson proscribed the patenting of all program-related
inventions,"° and held a method of operating a computer system con-
currently upon more than one processing program to be statutory sub-
ject matter." 5 As in Benson, the method under consideration involved
the internal operation of a computing system and had no specified end
use outside the art of data processing. The court, however, found that,
because the algorithms in the Chaield method were located only in the
dependent claims,'0 6 issuance of a patent would not preempt any of the
algorithms.' 7 The claims were viewed as being directed not to the al-
gorithms per se, but rather to a method of operating a computing sys-
tem (described in the independent claims) in which certain analytical
steps were to be carried out by the use of the specified algorithms.'08
Because patenting a method incorporating a dependent claim would
preempt the algorithm therein only insofar as it could be used in the
claimed method as a whole, there would not be, in practical effect, a
patent on the algorithm itself.'0 9 Unlike the Christensen method, which
was essentially a method for solving an equation, the Chaofeld method
was found to be a method for operating computing machines."10 Em-
102. 478 F.2d at 1396 (Rich. J., concurring); see text accompanying note 96 supra.
103. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
104. The Patent Office argued that certain language in Benson indicated that there should be a
moratorium on program patents until Congress had spoken: "If these programs are to be patenta-
ble, considerable problems are raised which only committees of Congress can manage .. " 409
U.S. at 73 (footnote omitted). Other language in Benson, however, pointed in the opposite direc-
tion: "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do
not so hold." Id at 71. Notwithstanding a statement in Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976),
characterizing the holding in Benson as "limited," two of the five-member panel in Chayield
agreed with the Patent Office in their dissent. 545 F.2d at 159 (dissenting opinion).
105. A "processing program" or "application program" processes data for some ultimate use
outside the computer. Most large computers work with more than one such program in the main
memory at any given time in order to maximize the use of the computer's operating capacity.
Chatfield's method described a new way of assigning program priorities within a computer's cen-
tral processing unit. 545 F.2d at 153-54. See also note 26 supra.
106. A dependent claim is one that incorporates by reference another claim. It is construed to
include all the limitations of the incorporated claim. An independent claim is simply a claim that
does not incorporate another claim by reference. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 201.
107. 545 F.2d at 158-59.
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id
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phasizing that claimed inventions must be viewed as a whole, the court
indicated that the "point of novelty" approach was not to be used in
conjunction with the Benson doctrine to determine subject matter pat-
entability."'
While the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 2 continued to em-
ploy the "point of novelty" approach in conjunction with the Benson
rationale when rejecting program-related inventions,' 1 3 the CCPA
looked to other criteria in hopes of formulating a workable doctrine.
Under consideration in In re Deutsch"4 was a method of operating a
system of multi-unit manufacturing plants using a computing appara-
tus to optimize selected process variables. The court viewed the process
not as a method of calculation, but as an "industrial process. . . even
further removed from that 'process' of Benson than was that of Chat-
field.""' 5 The court found that the claims did not seek to preempt a
mathematical algorithm because any algorithm disclosed would be
freely available for use by the public for any purpose other than the
operation of a system of plants as described in the claims." 6 Thus
avoiding the rationale of Christensen and Benson, the invention was
further found to be within a "technologically useful art" and, therefore,
to be a statutory process under section 101 of the Patent Act." 17
The CCPA indicated in In re Waldbaum," 8 however, that simply
I 11. To support its rejection of the "point of novelty" approach the court quoted a passage
from In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969), part of which appears in note 69 supra.
In the companion case to Cha~qeld, In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976), a three-to-two
majority also found that Benson would not apply if the claims for computer programs were drawn
in apparatus form. The reasoning in that case was also apparently based on Bernhart. See note 70
and accompanying text supra. In the later case of In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978),
however, the court clarified its position by indicating that "means plus function" apparatus claims
would not suffice to take the invention out of the Benson rationale if equivalent method claims
would be proscribed by Benson. 573 F.2d at 1247 & nn.10 & 11. See also In re Maucorps, 203
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 812 (C.C.P.A. Nov. 1, 1979). Thus, the status of apparatus claims on program-
related inventions will be determined by examination of equivalent method claims unless the
apparatus is described in structural terms. Although the Supreme Court was given the opportu-
nity to decide this issue in Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976), it declined to do so, preferring
instead to decide the case on § 103 grounds.
112. The Patent Office was renamed "The Patent and Trademark Office" in 1975. Act of Jan.
2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-596, 88 Stat. 1949 (1975).
113. See, e.g., In Re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 876 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026,
1029 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1240 (C.C.P.A. 1977). In each of these
cases the CCPA stated that the point of novelty approach was improper and would not be ac-
cepted by the court for the reasons cited in Cha#Feld.
114. 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
115. Id at 692.
116. Id
117. Id at 693.
118. 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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limiting the claims of an invention unpatentable under Benson so as to
prevent total preemption of the algorithm would not serve to bring the
invention into the category of patentable subject matter. The process in
Waldbaum was basically a method, described in terms of machine
steps, employing a mathematical algorithm for "counting" the relative
number of "O's" and "l's" in a "data word."' 9 Although the method
had general applicability in digital computers, one group of claims lim-
ited the monopoly sought to a specific application of the method in the
counting of busy and idle lines in a telephone system. 20 While noting
that a patent on such a method would not, as in Benson, preempt all
uses of the algorithm, the court recognized that the method was "di-
rected to a calculation," the counting of busy and idle telephone
lines. '2 A patent on the method would have preempted all use of the
algorithm in making that particular calculation and would have been,
"in practical effect,. . . a patent on the algorithm itself."' 22 While the
Chaofeldprocess was viewed as a "method of operating computing ma-
chines. . . employing particular algorithms," the Waldbaum process
was itself identified with the mathematical problem solving al-
gorithm. 23 The Waldbaum claims bore resemblance to those in Chris-
tensen in that both methods produced a number as a final result.
Waldbaum served to show that simply limiting claims so as not to pre-
clude other uses of the algorithm and wording the algorithm in
machine language would not help the inventor avoid the Christensen
rationale if claims were "directed to a calculation."
The applicant in In re F/ook, 24 however, distinguished his claims
from those in Christensen. Unlike Christensen's, Flook's method re-
cited post-solution activity that applied the result of the calculation to a
specific end use.' 25 The court reasoned, therefore, that the patentability
of Flook's method was not controlled by that case and that the sole
119. As explained by the court:
Each data word is composed of a plurality of bits (binary digits), Each bit has two
output conditions, one of which, for our purposes, is labeled 0 and the other of which, for
our purposes, is labeled 1. The method controls the data processor to determine the
number of bits in the I condition and the 0 condition.
Id at 612 n.2. See also note 22 supra.
120. The claims in this group were prefaced with the following language: "In the data proces-
sor of a processor-controlled telephone switching system." Id at 616 n.6.
121. Id at 616-17.
122. Id at 617.
123. Id at 616.
124. 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
125. The method is described at note 29 supra. The actual wording of the claim considered is
as follows:
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question remaining was whether the method was unpatentable under
Benson itself.'26 Because mere solution of the algorithm would not in-
fringe a patent issued on the Flook method, there would be no total
preemption of the algorithm if a patent was issued on the process as
claimed.'27 The court, however, neither mentioned nor discussed the
week-old decision of Waldbaum and thus skirted the issue of whether
the Rook method was essentially "directed to a calculation" even
though the last step of the method applied the solution to a specific end
use.
The court did deal with that issue in In re de Castelet.128 The
claims in that case described a "method of generating a curve or family
of curves, employing a computer in conjunction with drafting and mill-
ing machines."' 29 The curve generation was achieved through a com-
puter programmed to perform certain calculations upon stored and
incoming data, but the last step of the method was the transmittal of
the electrical signals representing the curve to a "model forming
means."130 The court found the method, considered as a whole, to be a
method of calculation and thus unpatentable subject matter.' 3 ' The
court stated that a method was not necessarily unpatentable if it merely
used a mathematical algorithm, but also indicated that not all post-
solution activity would allow a method to escape being characterized as
a method of calculation. 32  The decisive factor was whether the
1. A method for updating the value of at least one alarm limit on at least one
process variable involved in a process comprising the catalytic chemical conversion of
hydrocarbons wherein said alarm limit has a current value of
B, + K
wherein Bo is the current alarm base and K is a predetermined alarm offset which com-
prises:
(1) Determining the present value of said process variable, said present value be-
ing defined as PVL;
(2) determining a new alarm base B1, using the following equation:
B1=Bo(I.0-F) + PVL (F)
where F is a predetermined number greater than zero and less than 1.0;
(3) determining an updated alarm limit value which is defined as
III + K; and, thereafter
(4) adjusting said alarm limit to said updated alarm limit value.
Id at 22.
126. Id at 23.
127. Id
128. 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
129. Id at 1238.
130. Id at 1239.
131. Id at 1244.
132. That the computer is instructed to transmit electrical signals, representing the re-
sults of its calculations, does not constitute the type of post-solution activity found in
Flook. . .and does not transform the claim into one for a process merely using an
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claimed method was "essentially a mathematical calculation."'' 33 The
court further noted that the post-solution activity of the Flook inven-
tion established that "the claimed method involved simply the use of
an algorithm, and the claim was not in effect a claim to the algorithm
per se."' 34 The difference in the post-solution activity in Flook and de
Castelet was that de Castelet had failed to describe enough post-solu-
tion activity to prevent the "application" of the algorithm from being a
mere reformulation of the solution. 135
The de Castelet opinion greatly clarified the CCPA's interpretation
of the holding in Benson. It had long been held that, while a scientific
principle, or the mathematical expression thereof, was not patentable,
the application of such a principle was patentable subject matter. 36
The question in Benson was whether there existed such an application.
Although it is true that an inventor may not claim a mere "effect," as
was attempted in Morse, the de Castelet court noted that the nonexis-
tence of unclaimed alternative applications of the principle cannot pos-
sibly be determinative. If this were so, an inventor who first discovered
a practical use for a scientific principle could not obtain a patent until
at least one other application of the principle was discovered, and the
public would have to wait until that time for a disclosure of the inven-
tor's initial discovery1 37  Therefore, the CCPA concluded that the
holding in Benson must have been simply that the application of an
algorithm in a computer is not a sufficient application to raise the al-
gorithm to the status of a patentable process.' 38 Post-solution activity
such as that found in Flook, however, could qualify as sufficient appli-
cation, provided that it was more than a mere reformulation of the so-
lution, and provided that the claim did not totally preempt the
algorithm.
algorithm. The final transmitting step constitutes nothing more than reading out the
result of the calculations. Recitations of specific machine elements, i.e., the mere refer-
ence in the claims to a computer and model-former, cannot alone render statutory the
presently claimed subject matter as a whole.
Id (emphasis in original).
133. Id at 1243 (citing In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1027 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
134. Id (emphasis in original).
135. "The final transmitting step constitutes nothing more than reading out the result of the
calculations." Id at 1244.
136. See, e.g., MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 (1939). In
MacKay, RCA owned a patent on a particular antenna structure having a relationship of ele-
ments conforming to a mathematical formula. The Court indicated that the formula itself was not
patentable, but its use in describing the new and useful antenna did not render the claim invalid.
137. 562 F.2d at 1242-43 (relying on The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1, 534-35 (1887)).
138. Id at 1243.
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In re Richman,'39 decided on the same day as de Castelet, involved
another invention found to be directed to a method of calculation. The
opinion also clarified and reaffirmed the CCPA's stance against the
"point of novelty" approach. 4 ° The methods considered involved new
mathematical formulae for calculating an average boresight correction
angle for airborne, signal processing radar and for calculating the aver-
age vertical velocity component of the aircraft carrying the radar.14'
The inventor argued that his method, unlike the one in Christensen,
involved new methods of data collection as well as a new method of
calculation. The court, however, viewed the data gathering steps to be
dictated by the method of calculation; they were, in effect, merely part
of the method of calculation. 142 Thus, their novelty, or lack thereof,
would not affect the subject matter patentability of the process.143 Un-
like those in Cha~field, Deutsch and Flook, the claims in Richman re-
cited no post-solution activity in the "technological arts." The method
was, therefore, "essentially a mathematical calculation," and unpatent-
able under Christensen.'
The principles for determining subject matter patentability as de-
scribed in the cases discussed above may be summarized with the fol-
lowing rules:
I. A mathematical algorithm, like a mathematical
formula, does not constitute a patentable process.145
II. A process is unpatentable if a patent thereon would be,
in practical effect, a patent on a mathematical formula
or algorithm. 1
46
III. The process claimed is judged as a whole when deter-
mining subject matter patentability; even if an al-
gorithm constitutes the only novel element within a
process, this does not in itself bring that method under
rule II above. 14
IV. Limitation of the area of monopoly sought by the
claims does not, in itself, take the process out of rule II
139. 563 F.2d 1026 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
140. Id at 1029-30; see notes 111 & 113 and accompanying text supra.
141. 563 F.2d at 1027.
142. Id at 1030.
143. Id
144. Id
145. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
146. Id
147. E.g., In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
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above. 148
V. A process that is essentially a mathematical calculation,
or directed to a method of calculating, is unpatentable
subject matter.149
VI. A process that "merely uses" a mathematical algorithm
toward an end in a "technological field" may constitute
an application of the algorithm and thus be patentable
subject matter.150
VII. Post-algorithm solution activity in a "technological
field" may not be sufficient to bring a process under
rule VI above if such activity is merely a reformulation
of the solution to the algorithm.' 5'
III. THE EFFECT OF _PARKER v. FLOOK
The Supreme Court endorsed most of the above principles in
Parker v. look."2 The Court quoted passages from Gottschalk v. Ben-
son indicating that the approach to the issue of subject matter patenta-
bility would be taken in a manner corresponding to rules I and II
above.' 53 The Court also adopted the principles inherent in rules IV 154
and V' 55 and, in name at least, approved of rule 111.156 On the other
hand, while admitting that a process was not unpatentable simply be-
cause it contained an algorithm, 57 the Supreme Court did not adopt
the "mere use" approach of the CCPA embodied in rules VI and VII.
The Court found that focusing on the existence of post-solution activity
148. Eg., In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
149. E.g., In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
150. See In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977); cf. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (process must be in "technological field").
151. In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
152. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
153. The Court quoted the "nutshell" passage from Benson that appears in note 88 supra. 437
U.S. at 589.
154. "He [Flook] does not seek to 'wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula,' since there are
uses of his formula... that remain in the public domain. And he argues that the presence of
specific 'post-solution' activity ... distinguishes this case from Benson .... We cannot agree."
Id at 589-90.
155. "As the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has explained, 'if a claim is directed essen-
tially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula, even if the solution is for a spe-
cific purpose, the claimed method is nonstatutory.'" Id at 595 (quoting In re Richman, 563 F.2d
1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
156. 437 U.S. at 590; see text accompanying notes 172-77 infra.
157. "[I]t is. . . clear that a process is not unpatentable simply because it contains a law of
nature or a mathematical algorithm." 437 U.S. at 590.
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without regard to its conventionality or obviousness "exalts form over
substance" because a competent draftsman could attach some form of
post-solution activity to almost any mathematical algorithm."'8 Flook's
method was thus deemed nonstatutory subject matter under the Benson
rationale-a patent on the method would have been, in effect, a patent
on the algorithm itself.15 9
The Court attempted to replace the "mere use" test of the CCPA
with what may be called the "inventive application" test: a process
containing a mathematical algorithm is patentable only if, aside from
the algorithm itself, there is some inventive concept in the application
of the algorithm; 60 the algorithm itself must be considered to be in the
prior art.161 In response to the argument that the "inventiveness" re-
quirement is a consideration of sections 102 (novelty) and 103 (nonob-
viousness) of the Patent Act and is not properly a consideration of
section 101, the Court indicated that the objective of the announced test
was to determine "what type of discovery is sought to be patented," not
"whether that discovery is, in fact, new or obvious." 62 While this rea-
soning coincides with the view that Flook's method was unpatentable
because the claims sought, in effect, "a patent on the algorithm," it does
not parry the charge that the concepts of novelty and obviousness have
been imported into a section 101 test for subject matter. The Flook
method failed to constitute statutory subject matter precisely because
all of its constituent elements except for the algorithm were old.163
Thus, subject matter patentability was found lacking at least partially
because there was a lack of novelty in a portion of the invention.
158. Id
159. Id at 589, quotedat note 154 supra.
160. "Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an
inventive application of the principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phe-
nomenon cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application."
437 U.S. at 594.
161. In order to hold that the novel algorithm itself could not qualify as the inventive concept,
the Court relied on a passage from an 1844 English patent case, Nielson v. Harford:
'It is very difficult to distinguish it [the Neilson patent] from the specification of a
patent for a principle, and this at first created in the minds of the court much difficulty;
but after full consideration we think that the plaintiff does not merely claim a principle,
but a machine, embodying a principle, and a very valuable one. We think the case must
be considered as ifthe princple being well known, theplaintifgfhadfirst invented a mode of
applying it. . . .' We think this case must also be considered as if the principle or math-
ematical formula were well known.
Id at 592 (quoting Neilson v. Harford, Reports and Notes of Cases on Letters Patent for Inven-
tion 295, 371 (Ex. 1844) (emphasis in Flook)).
162. 437 U.S. at 593.
163. Id at 593-94, quoted at note 178 infra. The Court dissected Flook's invention into its
various components and noted that each element was well known except for the formula.
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Section 101 may be construed as requiring novelty and inventive-
ness in the subject matter sought to be patented. 164 But, while some
observers of the patent system have assumed these considerations to
fall within section 101,165 the CCPA is opposed to this view.t 66 Mem-
bers of the CCPA have consistently stated that subject matter patenta-
bility is entirely separate from the considerations of novelty under
section 102167 and that the judge-made concept of "invention" was en-
tirely replaced by the requirement of "nonobviousness," separately ap-
plied under section 103.168 The Supreme Court did not discuss either
of these contentions. The latest decision cited to support the require-
ment of "inventive application" for patentable subject matter was the
1948 case of Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 169 The issue in
that case was whether a product consisting of a combination of natu-
rally occurring bacteria was patentable. The Court found that the dis-
covery of the natural quality of certain bacteria in combination was not
patentable subject matter because it was a phenomenon of nature. The
holding of the case, however, seemed to be that the application of the
discovery embodied in the product was unpatentable because there was
a lack of "invention."'' 10 Had the 1952 Patent Act applied to that case,
164. The section contains both the word "new" and "invents." See note 9 supra.
165. See Edwards, That Clumsy Word "Nonobpiousness!", 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 3, 8 (1978);
Comment, supra note 96, at 509 & n.63.
166. See Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution in Legal Thinking Impossible?, 60
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 271 (1978).
167. "Considerations of novelty or obviousness are of no effect whatever in determining
whether particular claims define statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101." In re Freeman,
573 F.2d 1237, 1243 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
168. See Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 879, 909 n.20, (6th Cir. 1978) (Markey, C.J., C.C.P.A.,
sitting by designation); Rich, supra note 166. Both Chief Judge Markey and Judge Rich of the
CCPA outline the history of the "invention" requirement and argue that it was the intent of Con-
gress to completely replace the vague, judge-made "invention" requirement with section 103 of
the 1952 Patent Act. They also argue that the Supreme Court endorsed this reasoning in the case
of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
The "invention" requirement was first set forth in the case of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52
U.S. (I 1 How.) 248 (1850). It became the third requirement of patentability; novelty and utility
were required by statute. Although sometimes referred to as the degree or quantum of novelty
required for patentability, the concept also included other factors, such as the quantum of utility
provided by the new device or process. Various courts handled the concept in different ways and
a number of inconsistently applied rules became associated with the requirement. See P. RoSEN-
BERG, supra note 9, at 115-19. Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act was added in an attempt to
clarify the situation, but it is unclear whether the congressional intent was to completely replace
the invention requirement along with all the rules that had become associated with the require-
ment. The Supreme Court in John Deere referred to § 103 as a codification of prior law. 383 U.S.
at 17. The Court has also recently used concepts associated with the invention requirement in
making § 103 determinations. See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976) ("synergism"
required).
169. 333 U.S. 127 (1948), citedat 437 U.S. at 591.
170. Compare the language in Funk Bros.:
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section 103 would have entered into the discussion rather than the "in-
vention" requirement and the product could have been found obvious.
The viability of the "invention" requirement still remains unsettled;
however, if the Court in Flook did mean that the old, judge-made in-
vention requirement is required for subject matter patentability, it has
resurrected a doctrine that the CCPA has long considered to be
dead.17 1
Another important aspect of the Flook opinion is its treatment of
the "point of novelty" approach. The Court, by reference to a quota-
tion from In re Chapfeld, apparently agreed with the CCPA that claims
should be considered as a whole and not dissected into component
parts and rejected as nonstatutory if the only novel component is itself
nonstatutory. 172 Once the algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application is to be considered as a whole. 173 A question arises,
however, as to how much this really means. Given that an inventive
application is required for subject matter patentability, some inquiry
must be made into the novelty and obviousness of the invention. If the
algorithm must first be separated and considered to be within the prior
art, it would seem impossible to make a judgment on the invention
considered as a whole. Furthermore, if the only novel element of the
claimed process is an algorithm or mathematical formula, there can be
no novelty or inventiveness in the application, and the process will be
nonstatutory. Thus, the inventive application test produces the same
results as did rule two of Abrams, and the arguments of the CCPA in
Bernhart, Musgrave and Chafield rejecting that rule must apply with
the same force to the new Supreme Court test.'74 Although the Court
The application of this newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging
of innoculants may well have been an important commercial advance. But once nature's
secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was
discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed innoculant a simple step.
Even though it may have been theproduct of skill, it certainly was not theproduct of inven-
lion.
Id at 132 (emphasis added), with 35 U.S.C. § 103, quoted in part at note 38 supra (nonobviousness
requirement).
171. "The old judge-made requirement for 'invention' is not alive and well in all the federal
courts. . . . It is as dead as the dodo in the CCPA . Rich, supra note 166, at 302-03.
172. 437 U.S. at 595 & n.16.
173. "Respondent's process is unpatentable under § 101, not because it contains a mathemati-
cal algorithm as one component, but because once that algorithm is assumed to be within the prior
art, the application, considered as a whole, contains no patentable invention." Id at 595.
174. For example, the argument in Bernhart and Chafield is that it is irrelevant how the nov-
elty of an invention is expressed when determining subject matter. Section 101 simply states that
"processes" and "machines" are to be statutory subject matter. It seems irrelevant to that determi-
nation whether the inventor chooses to express the novelty of the process in a mathematical
formula or in some nonmathematical form. The inventive application test, however, would ex-
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adopted the broad langauge found in Chaoeld-that the claims must
be considered as a whole-it, in effect, adopted the point of novelty
approach that the Chaofeld opinion was directed against.
A possible indication of what the Court meant by the statement
that claims should be considered as a whole is offered by the Court's
reference to section 103.111 The nonobviousness requirement of that
section means that advancement over prior art must be judged by con-
sidering the total combination of factors contributing "inventiveness"
to the subject matter. 76 The statement by the Flook Court that a pat-
ent claim must be considered as a whole when judging subject matter
patentability apparently means only that, once the advancement of the
art contributed by the algorithm is subtracted, the search for an inven-
tive concept in its application will proceed on the same grounds as
would a check for nonobviousness under section 103. This procedure,
however, could not be allowed in a section 103 test because of the re-
quirement that obviousness must be determined as of the time the in-
vention is made.'77 Thus, in a section 103 test, if Flook's algorithm was
not obvious when the process was invented, it should not be considered
to be within the prior art.
clude from statutory subject matter any process, the novelty of which was expressed solely in
mathematical terms. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, the argument in Mus-
grave is that the state of the art is immaterial to the question whether a process in that field is or is
not statutory subject matter. See note 73 and accompanying text .mpra. Under the Supreme
Court's test a process would be statutory when the application of the algorithm was novel, but a
similar invention involving a new algorithm would be nonstatutory once the application became
well-known. These considerations seem to belong more in sections 102 and 103 than in a determi-
nation of proper subject matter. See also text accompanying notes 216-20 ina.
175. "Section 103, by its own terms, requires that a determination of obviousness be made by
considering 'the subject matter as a whole. . . . Although this does not necessarily require that
analysis of what is patentable subject matter under § 101 proceed on the same basis, we agree that
it should." Id at 594 n.16 (emphasis in original).
176. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 122. The test for nonobviousness should include
an examination of the entire picture, including such factors as, the relation between ad-
vantage or utility attained and the means selected for effecting same, the motivation for
the change as well as the change itself, obstacles (real or apparent) existing in the art, and
the source of the problem as well as the solution. What at first blush may appear obvious
may be demonstrated to be, in fact, unobvious.
Id One way of proceeding under this approach is first to judge the obviousness of each point of
novelty in the invention. If each advancement over the prior art, considered one by one, is obvi-
ous, then a case of prima facie obviousness has been made. The inventor may then attempt to
rebut the determination of prima facie obviousness by showing his invention to be nonobvious
when considered as a whole using the factors in the quotation above. Id Thus a process consist-
ing of a number of steps, each being in itself old, may, nonetheless, be patentable because of a new
order in which the steps are used, and an "unexpected result" occurring when the steps are used in
that order. Id at 73, 12-2.
177. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) quotedinpart at note 38 supra. There are minor exceptions to this
requirement not here relevant. See P. ROSENBERG, supra note 9, at 240.
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It is not clear how much "inventiveness" is required for an inven-
tive application; the only hint given by the Court is that Flook's appli-
cation was clearly noninventive because all components of the process,
except the algorithm, were well known.'78 It is reasonable to assume
that an inventive application simply means a novel and nonobvious
application. If this is the meaning of the inventive application test, the
Court has created an inventiveness requirement for processes including
algorithms that is even more restrictive than a section 103 test, and it
has made this test part of a section 101 test for statutory subject matter.
The thrust of the Flook opinion is clear: mathematical algorithms,
no matter how new and useful, are not patentable subject matter; they
should not, therefore, be transformed into patentable subject matter
through the simple expedient of claiming them within a conventional,
noninventive application. CCPA opinions written after Flook have
embraced the first concept, but not the second. In In re Sarker,179 the
CCPA was presented with a situation much like the ones in Christensen
and Richman. The method under consideration was a technique for
mathematically modeling an open channel, such as a stream or artifi-
cial waterway, using apparently novel mathematical equations and cer-
tain data-gathering steps that the inventor also alleged to be novel.'8 0
Although the court noted that the novelty of the data-gathering steps
would make no difference under the holding in Richman,'s' it chose to
decide the case on the basis of Christensen by finding, based on the
inventor's admissions, that the data-gathering steps were old.'8 2 The
most interesting aspect of the case was the court's treatment of the in-
ventor's argument that the Flook opinion supported his case.
Sarker asserts that [the data gathering step] is novel (because his
algorithm makes it operative) and nonobvious. Sarker says that
178. Here it is absolutely clear that respondent's application contains no claim of pat-
entable invention. The chemical processes involved in catalytic conversion of hydrocar-
bons are well known, as are the practice of monitoring the chemical process variables,
the use of alarm limits to trigger alarms, the notion that alarm limit values must be
recomputed and readjusted, and the use of computers for "automatic monitoring-alarm-
ing."
437 U.S. at 594 (footnote omitted).
179. 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
180. Id at 1330-31, 1334. The inventor also claimed a method of locating an "obstruction"
(e.g., a bridge or dam) in an open channel by use of the method. This would have called for
discussion of post-solution activity and its relationship to § 101, but the inventor did not orally
argue the issue of post-solution activity on appeal, and the CCPA felt it unnecessary to consider it.
Id at 1331, 1332 n.6.
181. Id at 1336 n.18; see text accompanying notes 139-142 supra.
182. Id at 1334-36; see text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
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makes his invention an "inventive application" of the algorithm, cit-
ing this from the majority opinion in Parker v. Flook ....
Beyond the irrelevance of novelty and nonobviousness consider-
ations to determinations under § 101, Sarker's difficulty is that [the
data gathering step], to the extent that it be considered novel, derives
such "novelty" solely from the algorithm itself.
183
This passage was the only substantive treatment of the Flook opin-
ion in Sarker. It produces the same results as does Richman-if the
algorithm dictates the data gathering steps, the novelty of those steps
will be of no consequence. Along with other portions of the Sarker
opinion, this quotation clearly indicates the CCPA's reluctance to im-
port the concepts of novelty and nonobviousness into a section 101 de-
termination,' 84 and its absolute refusal to revive the "invention"
requirement.18 5
The CCPA's initial approach to the Flook opinion seemed to be an
attempt, by careful interpretation, to narrow that decision to its very
facts. The court was presented with an opportunity to employ the in-
ventive application test in the case of In re Johnson. s6 Several meth-
ods were involved in that case, all of which consisted of new procedures
for removing undesired "noise" components from seismic data re-
corded as a function of time on a seismic trace as part of a conventional
method of geoprospecting.8 V All of the procedures employed the steps
of comparing waveforms produced by seismic detectors in order to de-
termine the similarity of the waveforms, using this information to filter
183. Id. at 1335-36 (footnote omitted). The court quoted the "inventive application" language
from Rook, quotedat note 160 supra, and in explanation of that passage noted that, "[Platent law
is statutory. Hence the word 'inventive' must be read as meaning 'novel and nonobvious.'"
184. Considerations of novelty and nonobviousness have no place in evaluations under
§ 101 as to whether an invention is within the categories of possibly patentable inven-
tions. These considerations arise, as the statute makes plain, under §§ 102 and 103, re-
spectively. Cognitive dissonance arises from references to "novelty," or to
"ppatentabiity," in reviewing a rejection under § 101. If the subject matter as claimed, is
subject to patenting , if it falls within § 101, it must then be examined for compliance
with §§ 102 and 103. Absent such examination (or admissions), no record basis exists for
determination or discussion of novelty, nonobviousness, or ultimate patentability.
Id at 1333-34 n.10 (citation omitted).
185. A § 101 determination is concerned (setting aside utility) only with whether the
claimed invention is within the categories there broadly enumerated. Since the 1952
Patent Act, and especially since Graham v. John Deere Co ... it has been clear that a
§ 101 determination in no way involves consideration of the existence of "invention," if
it ever did. The words "whoever invents" in § 101 are used in the sense of "whoever
originates," patentability of the thing originated being dependent, as § 101 states, on its
meeting the "requirements of this title."
Id at 1334 n.10 (citation omitted).
186. 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
187. Id at 1070-75.
COMPUTER PROGRM PATENTABILITY
out undesired portions of the trace corresponding to noise, and then
producing a new, noiseless trace. The court's analysis of the claims
based on Flook consisted of making two distinctions between the John-
son and Flook claims. The first distinction was that the Flook claim
"recited a novel mathematical procedure for computing a number
called an alarm limit," but the Johnson claims alleged "no such novel
mathematical procedures and [did] not seek a patent on a mathematical
formula.""" The last phrase is clearly conclusory and offers no aid in
analysis. That the Johnson inventors alleged no novelty in their mathe-
matical formulae, on the other hand, is relevant; it automatically
removes Johnson from the first portion of the inventive application test.
Unlike the Flook claim, the Johnson claims were alleged not to depend
solely on mathematical formulae for their novelty. The court did not,
however, go on to ask if there was an inventive application of the for-
mulae, but rather made a further factual distinction of Flook based on
the end use of the process. The Flook method was again stated to have
as its end purpose the computation of numerical values, while the John-
son methods were said to have the end purpose of filtering out extrane-
ous and erroneous components of a seismic trace and physically
recording a new, noiseless trace on a "record medium."'8i 9 The court
went on to state that "the significant limitations recited in the claims of
operating on a recorded, unenhanced, seismic trace to produce and rec-
ord a new seismic trace lead us to find the claims to recite statutory
processes and not methods of calculating as were present in Flook."190
The court was obviously suggesting that there was an application
of the mathematical formulae in Johnson because it produced a new
trace on a record medium, but that there was no such application of the
algorithm in Flook because it produced only numbers. This finding is
in direct contrast to the unanimous CCPA opinion in In re Flook,
which stated that the method was "a process for controlling at least one
parameter of a hydrocarbon conversion process,"' 91 and that "these
claims include a recitation of post-solution activity, a step in which the
solution is applied to a control system."' 92 If the second distinction in
Johnson is controlling, as it is suggested to be, even in cases in which
an algorithm contributes to the novelty of the claim, the court, in effect,
interpreted the holding in Flook to be a mere overruling of the CCPA
188. Id at 1078.
189. Id
190. I d
191. 559 F.2d at 23.
192. Id
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on the question whether sufficient post-solution activity was present in
that case. That is, the Flook method would be more properly classed
with those in the de Casteelet and Waldbaum cases, in which there was
little or no post-solution activity and the patent sought was, in effect,
for the algorithm itself, than with those in Chao/eld and Deutsch, in
which the algorithm was applied in post-solution activity to some
larger process. It is clear, however, that this was not the intent of the
Supreme Court in Flook. The focus of the opinion was not on the
quantity of post-solution activity, but on the conventionality of the
method. Although the Court did state that "la]n 'alarm limit' is a
number,"1 93 it also mentioned the conventionality of the process of
"automatic monitoring-alarming"' 194 and the presence of "'post-solu-
tion' activity."' 95 Indeed, the very issue of the Flook case, as phrased
by the Court, was "whether the identification of a limited category of
useful, though conventional, post-solution applications of. . . [a novel
and useful mathematical] formula makes respondent's method eligible
for patent protection."' 96
The rather strained interpretation of Flook that was foreshadowed
in Johnson was confirmed in In re Diehr.197 Asserting that the court's
view was "not in any way inconsistent" with the precedents set by the
Supreme Court in Benson and Flook,198 the CCPA summarily dis-
missed the inventive application test set forth in Flook as being unnec-
essary to the holding in that case. 199 The holding of Flook, according
to the CCPA, was simply that the Flook claims were "directed to meth-
ods of calculation," 2" and therefore "nonstatutory regardless of
whether the equation was old or new." '' Assuming the algorithm to
193. 437 U.S. 585.
194. Id at 594.
195. Id at 590.
196. Id at 585 (emphasis added). The answer, of course, was that only an inventive applica-
tion of such a formula could support a patent. Id at 594, quoted at note 160 supra.
197. 602 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
198. Id at 985.
199. Although in Flook the Supreme Court assumed the equation of the claim to be old
in the art even though it was not, the holding of that case does not depend on that mode
of analysis. Since Flook's claims were held to be directed to methods of calculation, they
were nonstatutory regardless of whether the equation was new or old. While the
Supreme Court in that case may have found that analysis a convenient vehicle to high-
light the fact that Flook's actual contribution to the useful arts was his new formula, we
do not believe the Court meant to establish that analysis as a general test in determining
compliance with § 101, especially when indiscriminately applied to claim limitations
generally.
Id at 987 n.6 (emphasis in original).
200. Id
201. Id (emphasis in original).
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be in the prior art merely served as "a convenient vehicle to highlight
the fact that Flook's actual contribution to the useful arts was his new
formula," and was not meant to establish a general test for section
101.202
The invention under consideration in Diehr was a method for op-
erating rubber-molding presses by using a computer to constantly in-
corporate changing temperature data and recompute the optimum time
for opening the presses according to a well-known formula.0 3 Once
the presence of the mathematical formula was acknowledged, the court
found the test to be simply" 'whether the claim merely recites a mathe-
matical formula or a method of calculation as in Benson and
F/ook.' ,2o4 Following its approach in Johnson, the court distinguished
the claimed invention from the one in F/ook by asserting that the Flook
claims recited nothing but a method of calculation "coupled with the
post-solution activity consisting only of updating an alarm limit to the
newly-calculated value which is merely a new number."20 5 In response
to PTO assertions that the Diehr claims were also directed to an im-
proved method of calculation, the court noted that "such a conclusion
is only made possible by ignoring the fact that a molding press is re-
cited and operates as the heart of the process. '2 6 The saving feature of
the Diehr claims was that they recited "a process involving the manipu-
202. Id
203. A representative claim reads as follows:
1. A method of operating a rubber-molding press for precision molded compounds
with the aid of a digital computer, comprising:
providing said computer with a data base for said press including at least,
natural logarithm conversion data (In),
the activation energy constant (C) unique to each batch of said compound being
molded, and
a constant (X) dependent upon the geometry of the particular mold of the press,
initiating an interval timer in said computer upon the closure of the press for moni-
toring the elapsed time of said closure,
constantly determining the temperature (Z) of the mold at a location closely adja-
cent to the mold cavity in the press during molding,
constantly providing the computer with the temperature (Z),
repetitively calculating in the computer, at frequent intervals during each cure, the
Arrhenius equation for reaction time during the cure, which is
In v = C Z + x
where v is the total required cure time,
repetitively comparing in the computer at said frequent intervals during the cure
each said calculation of the total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equa-
tion and said elapsed time, and
opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates equivalence.
Id at 983-84.
204. Id at 988 (quoting In re Johnson, 589 F.2d at 1077).
205. Id at 989.
206. Id at 988.
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lation of apparatus resulting in the chemical and physical change of
starting material."20 7
Both the Flook and the Diehr methods involved a mathematical
formula and repetitive calculations using continuous incoming data.
Both methods also used the results of the calculations in an industrial
process: the Diehr method used formula results to determine the opti-
mum cure time for a rubber-molding process and the Flook method
used the formula results to determine alarm limit values. The Diehr
claims purported to describe "a method for operating a rubber-molding
press"; after the optimum cure time elapsed the press automatically
opened. 8 The Flook claims were for a method of updating alarm lim-
its in a process comprising the catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons;209
after the new alarm limit value was computed, the alarm limit was re-
set. The CCPA distinguished these claims by simply noting that the
recitation of the molding process in the Diehr claims was more com-
plete and detailed than the recitation of the catalytic conversion process
in the Flook claims. The post-solution activity described in the Diehr
claims (opening the press once the calculated time had elapsed) and the
post-solution activity of the Flook claims (resetting the alarm limit in a
catalytic conversion process once the new value was calculated) cannot
be easily distinguished, 210 and the CCPA did not attempt to do so.
This should not be interpreted, however, as a retreat from the require-
ment of post-solution activity set forth in de Caste/et,2 " but rather as a
reaffirmation of rules set down before de Castelet. The CCPA will ex-
amine on a case-by-case basis not only the substance of the post-solu-
tion activity but also the pre-solution activity recited by a claim to
determine whether the claim as a whole recites a process other than one
that is essentially a calculation.21 2 Simply reciting that the method of
calculation is claimed only when used within a specified technological
process will not suffice to make the claimed method, as a whole, statu-
tory, at least not where the recited post-solution activity is minimal as
was the case in Plook.
The refusal of the CCPA to follow the Fook inventive application
207. Id
208. Id at 983, quoted at note 203 supra.
209. See note 125 supra.
210. Compare id (Flook claim) with the Diehr claim quoted at note 203 supra.
211. See notes 128-38 and accompanying text supra.
212. See notes 114-23 and accompanying text supra. In accordance with In re Richman, data
collection steps will be considered part of the calculation process. See text accompanying notes
141-43 supra.
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test is understandable. The adoption of the inventive application test
would have negated nearly all of the case law on program-related in-
ventions built up by the CCPA since the initial rejection of the "point
of novelty" approach in Prater.213 The two principal objections to a
requirement of inventive application were stated in Bernhart2t 4 and
Musgrave,2 15 and the court has depended on these precedents for at
least ten years. The Musgrave argument is simply that the issue of
proper subject matter should, for conceptual clarity, be decided before
the issues of novelty and obviousness are considered.21 6 If the issue of
proper subject matter is not resolved first, the concept of patentable
subject matter will be dependent on ultimate patentability and will be
useless as a concept separate from that of ultimate patentability. Al-
though this criticism could be avoided by applying the inventive appli-
cation test within the section 103 test for nonobviousness, such a
solution would require the courts to ignore the plain language of sec-
tion 103, which states that obviousness must be determined as of the
time the invention is made and that the invention must be considered
as a whole.21 7
Perhaps the more telling criticism of the inventive application test
is the one originally stated in Bernhart. If a mathematical relationship
within an invention is first assumed to be within the prior art and an
inventive application of the mathematical relationship is further re-
quired, the inventor is disadvantaged when compared with an inventor
who develops the same machine or process by trial and error and does
not disclose the mathematical relationship upon which the invention is
based.218 Although it is true that the inventor using a mathematical
213. See text accompanying notes 42-63 supra.
214. See notes 66-70 and accompanying text supra.
215. See notes 72-74 and accompanying text supra.
216. See note 73 supra. For a post-Flook exposition of this argument, and an argument that it
was the congressional purpose to separate the concepts, see In re Bergy (Bergy II) 596 F.2d 952,
959-64 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted sub nonm Parker v. Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
217. See text accompanying notes 173-78 supra.
218. For example, an inventor may seek to patent a certain configuration of electronic ele-
ments that produces totally new and previously unattainable results. The discovery may have
been made by accident when the inventor mistakenly placed one component in contact with an-
other, or it may have resulted from the inventor's new and more accurate theory of electronics,
which utilizes new mathematical formulae. If a patent is allowed when the first discovery is made
by accident, then a patent should also be allowed when the invention is the result of a new theory,
and it should make no difference that the invention is described in terms of a new mathematical
formula. If, however, the inventive application test is applied, and the entire novelty of the inven-
tion, as described in the claims, resides in the novel formula, a patent will not be granted. See also
notes 69 & 174 supra.
The CCPA in In re Bergy (Bergy II), 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. grantedsub nom. Parker
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relationship to describe part of his invention is likely to totally preempt
all presently known practical uses of the mathematical relationship,
this cannot by itself serve as a rationale for denying patent protection if
there is an application of the mathematical relationship to a practical
problem. To require an inventive application in addition to a newly
discovered mathematical relationship will encourage the inventor who
knows only of conventional applications of his new discovery to keep
the discovery secret. 219 If the invention is truly unworthy of a patent
because, considered as a whole, it is obvious, section 103 can be used to
prevent a patent from issuing. The inventive application test, however,
would be inappropriate in a section 103 test for the reason stated in In
re Bernhart. Once an inventor makes a new discovery, the application
of that new discovery to a practical problem may be obvious. Although
the discovery may not itself be patentable, it is a long-standing rule of
patent law that the discovery itself will not be held against the inventor
in determining the obviousness of his invention.220
Although both of these objections were raised in respondent's brief
in Flook, the opinion in FRook failed to adequately answer the first or
even address the second. Given the importance of the principles in-
volved, the CCPA cannot be blamed for its recalcitrant attitude toward
Flook.
v. Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979), discussed this troublesome feature of the Supreme Court's holding
in /ook.
Another principle stated in Flook is that a 'mathematical algorithm' or formula is
like a law of nature in that it is one of the 'basic tools of scientific and technological
work' and as such must be deemedto be a" 'familiar part of the prior art,'" even when it
was not familiar, was not prior, was discovered by the applicant for patent, was novel at
the time he discovered it and was useful. This gives to the term 'prior art', which is a
very important term of art in patent law, particularly in the application of § 103, an
entirely new dimension with consequences of unforseeable magnitude.
Insofar as the general patent law is concerned . . . the above-stated novel F/ook
doctrine may have an unintended impact in putting an untimely and unjustifiable end to
the long-standing proposition of law that patentability may be predicated on discovering
the cause of a problem even though, once that cause is known, the solution is brought
about by obvious means. Such causes may often be classed as laws of nature or their
effects. . .. The potential for great harm to the incentives of the patent system is appar-
ent.
It is one thing to say that a principle, natural cause, or formula, per se is not within
the categories of§ 101, but quite another to say it is 'prior art' in determining the nonob-
viousness of an invention predicated on it even though the inventor discovered it.
Id at 965-66 (emphasis in original).
219. See text accompanying notes 136-38 supra.
220. See note 218 supra. Once the law of nature or scientific principle upon which the inven-
tion is based is explained, there remains very little mystery about the invention. Although the
discovery of the principle is not patentable, the application of the principle is patentable. If the
discovery, however, were to be considered known in the prior art, the application of the discovery
would often seem to be obvious.
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IV. CLAIMS NOT RECITING AN ALGORITHM
It must be noted that, because the Benson and Flook opinions
were limited to processes including mathematical algorithms, many
program-related inventions escape analysis under these opinions sim-
ply because they do not contain such algorithms. For example, In re
Freeman,22" ' a CCPA case decided before the Supreme Court's decision
in Flook, involved program-related method and apparatus claims for a
system of typesetting using a computer based control system in con-
junction with a conventional phototypesetter.222 The Freeman method
contained a "step by step" procedure that could be classified as an al-
gorithm in the general sense of the word.223 The CCPA, however,
strictly limited the use of the term "algorithm" to the restricted mean-
ing of the word found in Benson .224 The court admitted that a mathe-
matical algorithm could be recited indirectly in prose as was done in
Waldbaum and de Castelet, but found that no part of the Freeman
claim recited steps that were equivalent to methods of calculations.225
In the specification the inventor did disclose a computer program that
would perform the method,226 but the court stated that the conclusion
that every implementation within a digital computer equals an al-
gorithm in the Benson sense was "without basis in the law." 227 Because
no algorithm was found, the claims entirely escaped examination under
the Benson line of cases, and the claims were held statutory.
Freeman illustrates the importance of the algorithm approach in
dealing with computer program-related inventions. Had the wording
of the Freeman claims at any step indicated the necessity of production
of numerical values or operation upon mathematical concepts, an al-
gorithm would have probably been found and the claims subjected to
221. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
222. The method claims called for the assigning of "concatenation points" to each character to
appear on the display device, specifying which concatenation points for adjacent characters
should coincide, testing and modifying the spatial relationship between adjacent characters to
provide for minimum clearance, and employing a hierarchical tree structure to establish the
proper spatial relationships among the characters. Id at 1238-40. The method was specially
designed to place symbols of different sizes in positions subordinate or superior to one another as
well as in the proper line or order. It was thus quite useful in the printing of mathematical formu-
lae.
223. The inventor did refer to his method as employing a "local positioning algorithm." Id at
1246.
224. See note 30 supra.
225. 573 F.2d at 1246.
226. Id at 1242.
227. Id at 1245. The CCPA continues to hold this view. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 203 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 971 (C.C.P.A. Nov. 15, 1979).
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the tests for patentable subject matter developed after Benson.228 It
may be argued that this procedure is arbitrary in penalizing only those
program-related inventions that employ mathematical concepts in their
claims. Computer programs must ultimately direct electrical impulses
through computer circuitry to solve problems. The internal workings
of the computer are based on the principles of binary arithmetic and
the performance of elementary mathematical and logical operations, so
that, in the final analysis, the program must carry out its problem-solv-
ing activity through the solution of essentially mathematical
problems.22 9 Therefore, a process that incorporates a computer pro-
gram may be viewed as indirectly reciting mathematical problem-solv-
ing activity. The CCPA initially recognized that this argument could
be made, but considered the factual questions involved to be improper
for consideration by the court. 3 ° In the case of In re Bradley,23' how-
ever, the court did reach the issue and held that, when no solution to a
mathematical problem is described in the claims, a computer's use of
number representation in problem-solving activity does not in itself
constitute arithmetic calculation sufficient to invoke Benson and
HFook.
2 3 2
228. See In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1077 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32 (C.C.P.A. 1979), demonstrated that a particular mathematical
relationship between two or more values or defined variables need not be recited in order for
claims to be subjected to the Benson and Flook analysis. The invention in Gelnovatch was essen-
tially a computerized modeling method for testing and determining the necessary electrical quali-
ties of components in microwave generation circuitry needed to produce microwaves of a given
frequency. The court indicated that, although a similar method accomplishing the same end
might be described without constituting a "method of calculation," the Gelnovatch method did
employ mathematical values and operations to solve a mathematical problem and thus had to be
examined under Flook and Benson. Id at 41-42. Judge Markey dissented on the ground that the
modeling system was not equivalent to a mathematical expression of a scientific principle or law
of nature and, therefore, should not fall under the rationale of Benson and Flook. Id at 42-48
(dissenting opinion).
229. See note 22 supra.
230. We do not consider the question whether the mere recitation of a step involving
computer activity, but not otherwise reciting an algorithm, "indirectly recites" an al-
gorithm. That issue was neither considered by the [Patent and Trademark Office Board
of Appeals] nor argued before us. Furthermore, the question involves factual inquiries
which an appellate court is ill-equipped to accomplish.
In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 877 n.7 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (holding program-related invention for trans-
lating natural languages statutory subject matter).
231. 600 F.2d 807, 811-12 (C.C.P.A. 1979),petitionforcert.Jiledsub no. Diamond v. Bradley,
No. 79-855 (U.S. 1979), reprinted in PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., Dec. 13, 1979, at E-1.
232. The PTO estimates that it has pending over 1800 applications for program-related pat-
ents that do not incorporate mathematical algorithms. Petition for Certiorari, Diamond v. Brad-
ley, No. 79-855 (U.S. 1979), reprintedin PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., Dec. 13, 1979, at E-l, E-4. In
its petition for certiorari, the PTO argues that the rationale of Benson and Fook does not depend
on the mathematical nature of the algorithm involved; nonmathematical algorithms are merely
ideas or concepts and the common law has traditionally held ideas or concepts unpatentable
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V. CONCLUSION
The Sarker, Johnson and Diehr decisions clearly outline the
CCPA's position on program-related inventions after Flook. The
Flook opinion has had little if any effect on the CCPA's approach to
program-related inventions. The incorporation of a computer program
will have no effect on the subject matter patentability of an invention
unless a mathematical algorithm is also recited in the claim. A claim
reciting an algorithm, but describing a process or apparatus in the tech-
nological arts, will still survive under the CCPA's interpretation of
FHook unless the claim "as a whole is directed essentially to a method
of calculation or mathematical formula." 33 This determination will be
made on a case-by-case basis, but the post-Flook cases indicate that the
analysis will proceed according to guidelines created before the
Supreme Court's decision in Flook. If a claim recites some post-solu-
tion activity and a fair amount of a technological process or apparatus
that does not involve calculation, the conventionality of the recited
process or apparatus will not defeat the subject matter patentability of
the invention.234
The Patent and Trademark Office is not receptive to this interpre-
tation of Fook.235 Deluged with applications for program-related pat-
whether or not they are expressed in mathematical form. Because all computer programs, in the
final analysis, must be concerned solely with data that can be represented numerically, they must
themselves be "abstract intellectual concepts," and, therefore, unpatentable. Id at E-3 to E-4.
This argument goes too far. Most if not all process inventions begin as unpatentable ideas;
applying the idea to improve a process within the technological arts allows the inventor to exclude
others from using his idea in the claimed process. The Supreme Court in Benson determined that
a method of calculation or algorithm, like an idea or scientific principle, was unpatentable and
that application of the algorithm within a computer would not be sufficient application to trans-
form the unpatentable algorithm into a technological process patentable under § 101. The ration-
ale for the second part of the holding is not that computers fall outside the "technological arts"-
computers are clearly within the technological arts. The Benson opinion emphasized that the only
practical method of performing some calculations is by use of a computer, but as noted above, see
notes 136-38 and accompanying text supra, this cannot be the rationale for the decision. The key
to understanding Benson is noting that the method of calculation under consideration remained a
method of calculation even when transposed into claims on certain computer activity. A
nonmathematical idea, however, will not necessarily become a method of calculation when trans-
posed into claims reciting computer activity. For example, a process for more efficiently operating
a computing system would involve a computer program, but could be described in a
nonmathematical manner. The idea for the process would be an "abstract intellectual concept,"
but the idea is applied to a problem in a technological field. It should not matter that the idea is
for a more efficient method of conducting electrical impulses through circuits rather than, for
example, a more efficient method of transporting materials in a manufacturing process. Cf. Eibel
Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923) (process using force of gravity
to speed printing process held patentable subject matter).
233. In re Diehr, 602 F.2d at 987.
234. See id at 988-89.
235. The PTO has indicated that it will ask the Supreme Court to review the CCPA's decision
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ents and lacking the administrative means to process them properly,23 6
the PTO seeks to use section 101 to exclude these inventions from pat-
entability by using the threshold issue of subject matter patentability. 23 7
The PTO has consistently argued, and will continue to argue, that
Parker v. Flook actually called for a moratorium on program-related
patents.23 8 Support for this view is obtained from the final portion of
the Flook opinion in which the Court, speaking of program patents,
warned that it was the duty of the Court to "proceed cautiously when
.. . asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Con-
gress.' '239 The CCPA, however, responded to this argument in Sarker
by pointing out that the patent system is designed to encourage techno-
logical breakthroughs and that Congress cannot be expected to amend
the Patent Act annually to incorporate every breakthrough into "new
technological terrain."240 The CCPA has undoubtedly taken the more
reasonable side of this argument, and only the strongest words from the
Supreme Court will cause it to turn from this position.24'
Aside from the administrative problems left to the PTO, the most
unfortunate consequence of Flook and the post-Flook CCPA decisions
is the likely confusion and fragmentation of opinion that will occur in
federal courts deciding patent cases. Although the CCPA can effec-
tively cause patents on program-related inventions to issue by overrul-
ing the PTO when the latter uses the inventive application test, the
validity of these types of patents can also be challenged in other federal
courts in infringement actions.242 These courts will naturally look to
the most recent Supreme Court decision, Parker v. Flook, which tells
them to consider the algorithm to be part of the prior art and to look
for an inventive application of the algorithm. If the interpretative
opinions by the CCPA, the court most experienced in patent matters,
in Diehr. Petition for Certiorari, Diamond v. Bradley, No. 79-855 (U.S. 1979), reprintedin PAT.
T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., Dec. 13, 1979, at E-1, E-4.
236. See id
237. See In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Markey, J., dissenting).
238. See, e.g., Petition for Certiorari, Diamond v. Bradley, No. 79-855 (U.S. 1979), reprinted in
PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., Dec. 13, 1979, at E-l, E-4.
239. 437 U.S. at 596.
240. 588 F.2d at 1333.
241. See In re Bergy (Bergy 11), 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979). The CCPA had previously approved the subject matter patentability
of living organisms and was asked by the Supreme Court to reconsider this decision in light of
what was said in Parker v. Flook. The CCPA, speaking through Judge Rich, marshalled several
arguments against the narrow view of patentable subject matter delineated in Flook and refused
to change its decision on the subject matter patentability of the living organisms. Id at 987. The
Supreme Court has again granted certiorari. 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
242. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281-293 (1976); 28 U.S.C. 1338 (1976).
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are not consistent with this Supreme Court opinion, even a semblance
of uniformity among federal courts will be impossible.243 The predict-
able result of this process is exemplified by the continuing controversy
over the requirement of "synergism," which has not been settled since
the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act despite several decisions by the
Supreme Court.2" The ultimate conclusion must be that yet another
decision by the Supreme Court is needed to settle the issue of program-
related patents and that, insofar as Flook was intended to clarify the
area and to relieve pressure on the PTO, it was a dismal failure.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the CCPA is qualified to deter-
mine whether the patenting of program-related inventions will further
the objectives of the Patent Act.245 The determination of this issue re-
quires the use of empirical data beyond the reach of the courts and
involves policy questions better suited to consideration by Congress. 246
Unfortunately, Congress shows no signs of acting on the matter. Nev-
ertheless, inventors of program-related inventions must choose between
the mutually exclusive alternatives of patent and trade secret protec-
tion, and the courts must at least provide a consistent theoretical basis
upon which inventors can rely in making this choice. The theoretical
basis of Flook has little support in modem patent law; if applied to
other areas of patent law, the consequences would be of an "unforesee-
able magnitude."'247 The CCPA's approach, on the other hand, does fit
within accepted principles of modem patent law. If the CCPA's ap-
proach is adopted, however, the PTO will continue to receive more ap-
plications than it can properly process, and some inventions may be
patented that do not comport with the purposes of the Patent Act. Be-
cause no court can properly resolve this policy issue, however, the theo-
retical basis used by the CCPA should be adopted by the Supreme
Court,248and the PTO should petition Congress for appropriate relief,
243. A recent Court of Claims decision employed the interpretation of Flook suggested by the
CCPA. See Arshal v. United States, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 749, 760, (Ct. Cl. May 11, 1979).
244. See Rich, supra note 166, at 295-303. Compare Herchensohn v. Hoffman, 593 F.2d 893
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 84 (1979) ("synergism" required) with AMP Inc. v. Bunker
Ramo Corp., 604 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1979) ("synergism" not required). The requirement of "syner-
gism" is a concept that is sometimes applied by courts to find an invention obvious. "Synergism"
exists if a combination of old elements having known effects produces "an effect greater than the
sum of the several effects taken separately." Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co.,
396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969).
245. See note 4 supra.
246. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
247. In re Bergy (Bergy II), 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted sub nom. Parker v.
Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979), quoted at note 218 supra.
248. On March 17, 1980, the Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari by the Solicitor
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either in the form of an increase in funds to process the applications
generated by program-related inventions or a statutory exemption of
such inventions from the protections afforded by the Patent Act.
HAROLD L. JOHNSON, JR.
General to review In re Bradley and In re Diehr. The Court also granted the Solicitor General's
request that the cases be argued in tandem. PAT. T.M. & COPYRIGHT J., March 20, 1980, at A-3.
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